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Regulating Refugee Flow: Legal Alternatives and
Obligations Under the Refugee Act of 1980
John A. Scan/an *
I. Introduction
Does the United States possess the means to insure that individual aliens at
or within its national boundaries having a "well-founded fear of persecution"'
will not be returned to their country of origin? Do the political branches of gov-
ernment-particularly the United States Congress-possess adequate means of
regulating the influx of those fearful of persecution and seeking admission from
abroad? Do the nation's obligations under domestic2 and international3 law to-
ward the first group-those seeking "asylum,"'4 "withholding of deportation," 5 or
"non-refoulement" 6 -render impossible overall control of refugee admissions even if
stringent limits are imposed on those making application from abroad?
These three questions have been pertinent since 1968, when the United
States first obligated itself "not to expel or return" aliens at or within its borders
whose "life or freedom would be threatened on account of [their] race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion."'7 Yet
these questions have become more pertinent in the aftermath of the Refugee Act
of 1980 (the 1980 Act),8 which has at least theoretically more clearly delineated
the rights of those seeking asylum, and opened the doors wider for those applying
for admission as "refugees." 9 In the wake of recent events in Indochina, Africa,
and the Caribbean, the greater legal pertinence of these questions has been
* Assistant Faculty Fellow, University of Notre Dame Law School. J.D., University of Notre Dame,
1978; Ph.D., University of Iowa, 1975.
1 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 101 (a) (42) (A), (B), as added by the Refugee Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), (B)) [sections of the
Immigration and Nationality Act added or amended by the Refugee Act of 1980 hereinafter cited as INA
(amended 1980)]. See text accompanying notes 69-70 infa.
2 See INA §§ 208, 243(h) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1253(h)).
3 In 1968, the United States entered into a multilateral treaty acceding to the Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, of 31 January 1967 [hereinafter cited as the 1967 Protocol], 19 U.S.T. 6223,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1968). The effect of this treaty is to adopt the substantive provisions, as subsequently
modified, of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, No. 2545, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
[hereinafter cited as the 1951 Convention]. Article 33 of the 1951 Convention prohibits the explusion or
return of most refugees from a country of first asylum. See text accompanying notes 72-82 in/ra.
4 This is the term employed in INA § 208 (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158). It is
essentially equivalent to the term "non-refoulement," derived from article 33 of the 1951 Convention. See
note 5 in/ta. In international usage, "asylum" has a broader meaning, roughtly equivalent to a right of
entry and subsequent continued residence.
5 See INA § 243(h) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)). The term is discussed
more fully in the text accompanying note 69 in/ta.
6 Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention forbids a "Contracting State" to "expel or return ('refouler')"
refugees covered by its terms.
7 1951 Convention, supra note 3, art. 33 § I, asr modftedy 1967Protocol, Spra note 3, art. I,§ 2.
8 Section 208 was added to the INA, and INA § 243(h) was substantially modified by the Refugee
Act of 1980 §§ 201(b), 203(e), Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. Both changes were intended to bring
United States refugee law into conformity with international standards. H.R. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 20 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as the "Conference Report"].
9 The current definition of "refugee" continued in INA § 101 (a)(42) (amended 1980) (to be codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)) replaces the one formerly implied by INA § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7)
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matched by a growing awareness of the immensity and intractability of the
worldwide refugee problem, and its capacity to affect United States immigration
policy, social service delivery systems, and the attitudes of those competing with
refugees for-social services and for jobs.
Historically, the United States has led the world in willingness to admit im-
migrants.' 0 Yet for at least one hundred years that willingness has competed
with widespread public sentiment in favor of limiting immigrant flow." Since
the beginning of World War I, legislation has limited the number of immigrants
admitted.' 2 Since the end of World War II, governmental responses to the na-
tional awareness of worldwide refugee problems have permitted a number of ref-
ugees to enter the United States outside of the mandated immigration system.
Noting this disparity between authorized and actual admissions, '3 the drafters of
the 1980 Act established a new, flexible provision regulating the flow of refugees
applying from outside the country. Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA)
section 207,' 4 enacted as part of the 1980 Act, thus establishes a separate
"quota" for such refugee admissions. This quota is independent of the "quota"
for ordinary "preference" immigrants.' 5 It is to be determined annually by the
President after "appropriate consultation" with Congress. 16 No statutory upper
limits on the refugee quota are imposed,' 7 and that quota does not in any way
regulate the admission of aliens first entering the country and then seeking asy-
lum, although such asylum seekers are granted specific rights under the Act.
According to its drafters, the 1980 Act is not designed to "really increase our
annual immigration flow,"'" and merely provides a "more rational, stable and
equitable Federal policy for the admission of refugees to this country and for
assistance to them within the United States."' 9 Such a policy was envisioned as
"coherent and comprehensive, '20 rather than reactive and "ad hoc."'2 ' This pol-
icy was designed to replace a narrow political and geographical definition of ref-
(1965) (repealed). Under that former "seventh preference," only aliens from "communist-dominated"
countries or the Middle East were eligible for refugee status.
10 Since 1776, the United States has admitted approximately 50,000,000 persons as immigrants. Of
these, at least 2,000,000 were admitted as "refugees," "displaced persons," or the like. See CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW & POLICY 1952-1979, 15-25 (1979); S. REP. No. 256, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979).
11 Seegenera/y E. HARPER & F. AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OFTHE UNITED STATES 3-48 (3d ed.
1975).
12 Act of Feb. 5, 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874 (imposed literacy requirement designed to
limit immigration); Act of May 19, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, 42 Stat. 5 (imposed national origins quota
limiting the number of slots available to immigrants from particular countries; system remained in effect
through 1965, despite two major recodifications of immigration law).
13 See H. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 2-5 (1979).
14 INA § 207 (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157).
15 Non-refugees applying for admission are limited by the numerical limitations set forth in INA
§ 201(a) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1151). Under current law, 270,000 ordinary immi-
grant visas will be issued in any fiscal year.
16 INA § 207(a) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)) provides for a determination of
the annual refugee quota by the President "after appropriate consultation" with Congress. Through fiscal
year 1982, the President will be permitted to admit up to 50,000 refugees annually without submitting to
consultation as to the number, although he will still have to consult about the allocation of that number
among applicants from different countries.
17 Id.
18 S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979).
19 H. REP. No. 608, 96TH CONG., 1sT SESS. 6 (1979) (testimony of former Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance).
20 Id. at 1.
21 S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Ses. 9 (1979).
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ugee with a broader "humanitarian" definition 22  and to substitute a
congressionally monitored executive designation of refugee admission numbers
for the past practice of indirectly generating those numbers in the office of the
Attorney General, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the
State Department through grants of large-scale group parole. 23
However, even as the 1980 Act went into effect, its ability to regulate refugee
flow and provide humane standards for admission in a "coherent and compre-
hensive" manner was called into question by a unique combination of circum-
stances. The circumstances included the continued large-scale migration of
Indochinese from southeast Asia into the United States, a continued flow of Hai-
tian "boat people" to Southern Florida, and a sudden influx of somewhat similar
"boat people" from Cuba. Coming during a time of deep domestic economic
and political malaise, these large-scale movements of real and potential refugees
have generated unprecedented concern about United States refugee policy and
about the efficacy of the 1980 Act.
Such concern stems largely from the sheer magnitude of the number of refu-
gees involved. Although completely reliable statistical comparisons cannot be
drawn before 1965, when immigration from the Western Hemisphere was first
directly regulated,24 between 1948 and 1978 total annual legal immigration aver-
aged about 330,000 persons per year, and never exceeded 462,315 persons per
year.2 5 In 1980, the total number of immigrants approached 800,000.26 Of these
immigrants, at least 375,000 entered as "refugees" or sought refugee status after
entering by formally or informally seeking "asylum."'2 7 The number of those
granted or seeking refugee status was not entirely unprecedented: 400,000 "dis-
placed persons" were admitted to the United States over a five-year period after
World War 11.28 In the first eighteen years of the Castro regime, nearly 700,000
Cuban refugees entered the United States.2 9 Authorized refugee admissions from
1948 through 1979 exceeded 1,700,000;30 prior to 1965 legislation repealing the
"national origins" quota formula, more than one-eighth of the post-World War
22 H. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979).
23 Statistics for actual and authorized parole use through 1979 are contained in S. REP. No. 256, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979).
24 Prior to passage of the Act of Oct. 3, 1965, 79 Stat. 911, unlimited immigration was permitted from
countries of the Western Hemisphere. The Act put in place a prospective quota on Western Hemisphere
visas which went into effect on July 1, 1968. The Act of Oct. 20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703,
had the effect of withdrawing all special treatment for Western Hemisphere applicants, and of creating a
"one world" system.
25 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 10, at 25, 85.
26 This figure is based on authorized immigration of 280,000 quota aliens, authorized immigration of
234,500 refugees, unauthorized entry of at least 150,000 aliens who may be eligible for statutory asylum
under INA § 208 (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158), and the entry of perhaps 120,000
aliens who are close relatives of American citizens and hence may be admitted as non-quota immigrants
under the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1976) (INA § 201(b)).
27 Not all those who may be eligible for asylum have either sought it, or applied for withholding of
deportation under INA § 243(h) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (h)). See text accom-
panying notes 46-48 in/a for a discussion of this point.
28 "Through June 30, 1953, 399,698 persons were admitted to the United States under the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948, as amended." E. HARPER & F. AUERBACH, supra note 11, at 17.
29 S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979).
30 The statistic is based on (1) the history of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62
Stat. 1009, and its extensions, the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400, and (2) the
figure provided by S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979). Id.
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II aliens entering the United States were refugees.3 ' But the United States' ap-
parent intention to continue admitting at least 200,000 refugee applicants each
year,32 including 14,000 each month from Indochina, 33 is unique. The arrival on
the shores of the United States of approximately 130,000 Cubans34 and 10,000-
15,000 Haitians35 seeking or likely to seek asylum is also unique.36
More than any other immigrant group, the Cuban and Haitian "boat peo-
ple" have tested the regulatory capacity of the 1980 Act and have called into
question the utility of its more humane refugee definition. Concern about both
these issues has become more acute due to the uncertain status of these aliens and
the special difficulties they pose for host communities. Because the Cuban and
Haitian boat people apply for refuge only after disembarking in the United
States, they fit squarely within new statutory provisions governing the grant of
"asylum." Although the language of the 1980 Act is not free of ambiguity, Con-
gress clearly intended that any individual eligible for the protection of article 33
of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees37 be eligible for asy-
lum in the United States under INA section 208.38 Asylum is thus a right or
privilege personal to every applicant "physically present in the United States or
at a land border,13 9 provided he or she meet the statutory definition of refugee. 40
No limit is placed on the admission of "asylees" under the Act, although a limit is
31 See Tables at 111 CONG. REc. 24771 (1965). More than half of all immigrants entering the United
States during this period came outside the national origins quota system. Id. at 24772 (remarks of Sen.
Ellender).
32 Under the allocation report submitted to Congress in April, 1980, the number of refugees to be
admitted under INA § 207 (amended) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157) for fiscal year 1980 was 234,500.
126 CONG. REc. S3961 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1980). Allocation figures for fiscal year 1981, as reported in
September, 1980, were 217,000. 126 CONG. REC. S12988 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980).
33 Se note 32 rupra.
34 This was the figure recited on December 5, 1980 by then-Ambassador Victor H. Palmieri, the U.S.
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, at the Conference on World Hunger and Refugees held at the Institute of
of Politics and Government, University of Southern California.
35 Ambassador Palmieri indicated that over 11,000 Haitians had arrived. See note 35 supra. The
number may now be higher.
36 The INS's inability to process all applicants for asylum when they arrived in the United States
created a backlog of cases which may take a year to clear. Processing of asylum claims by Haitians in the
Southern District of Florida is enjoined pending adoption of new INS procedures by Judge King's decision
in Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980). Since the special status of
"Cuban/Haitian entrant" was established on June 20, 1980 (and renewed on Dec. 29, 1980), many
Cubans eligible for that status have not reported back to the INS for asylum processing.
37 See note 3 supra.
38 According to the Conference Report, the asylum and withholding of deportation provisions
adopted
provided for withholding deportation of aliens to countries where they would face persecution,
unless their deportation would be permitted under the U.N. Convention and Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees.
The House amendment provided a similar withholding procedure unless any of four spe-
cific conditions (those set forth in the aforementioned international agreements) were met.
The Conference substitute adopts the House provision with the understanding that it is
based directly upon the language of the Protocol and it is intended that the provision be con-
strued consistent with the Protocol. The Conferees direct the Attorney General to establish a
new uniform asylum procedure under the provisions of this legislation.
H.R, REP. No. 96-781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980).
39 INA § 208(a) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)).
40 The definition for refugee provided in INA § 101(a)(42) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)) is applicable to the admission of statutory refugees under both INA §§ 207 and 208
(amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157, 1158). However, a somewhat different "refugee" defi-
nition is implied in INA § 243(h) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)). See text accom-
panying notes 69-82 infta.
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placed on the number of asylees permitted to adjust their status to that of "per-
manent resident" in any given year.4 1 In other words, although indirect control
may be exerted in processing individual applications, no direct means of control-
ling asylee flow exists. Procedures for processing asylee applications are currently
in place, 42 but have not proved adequate to handle the large number of individu-
als already claiming, or likely to claim, asylum. Also, the procedures have proved
inadequate or inequitable in substantively determining who is or is not a refugee.
Difficulties in implementing the law's asylum provisions led the Carter adminis-
tration to bypass them, at least temporarily, by creating a special "Cu-
ban/Haitian entrant" designation.43 This designation gives Cubans and
Haitians who arrived in the United States before June 20, 198044 leave to remain
in the country until July 15, 1981. 4 5 Most Cubans and Haitians have not yet
filed their asylum applications,46 or their applications are still pending.4 7 Thus,
most have not yet had the refugee definition applied to determine their eligibility
to remain. Measures have been introduced in Congress which would grant the
Cubans and Haitians permanent residence without ever being subjected to ap-
plication of the refugee definition. 48
Such ad hoc processing, so far removed from the "coherent and comprehen-
sive" objectives of Congress, has engendered a widespread belief that the United
States has no refugee policy, that refugee admissions are completely out of con-
trol, and that Congress lacks effective means of regulating administrative discre-
tion. This belief has been intensified by the relationship refugee admissions bears
to overall immigration and by growing public concern over large numbers of
"illegal" or "undocumented" aliens entering the United States and its weakened
job market.49 Tensions between the new arrivals and other groups in society
have arisen in a number of places.50 These tensions have been aggravated by
growing competition over limited social service resources. Until October 10,
41 INA § 209(b) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)) specifies:
Not more than five thousand of the refugee admissions authorized under section 207(a) in any
fiscal year may be made available by the Attorney General, in the Attorney General's discre-
tion and under such regulations as the Attorney General may prescribe, to adjust to the status of
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence the status of any alien granted asylum
42 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.1-.15 (1981). Such regulations are mandated by § 204(d)(2) of the Refugee Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 109.
43 Announcement of Ambassador Victor H. Palmieri, U.S. Coordinator of Refugee Affairs (June 20,
1980).
44 Id.
45 See 2 REFUGEE REPORTS, Jan. 9, 1981, at 3 (Am. Pub. Welfare Ass'n). The parole extension ap-
plies to Cubans and Haitians who arrived to October 10, 1980. The parole of June 20, 1980 applied only
to those who arrived prior to the date of the parole.
46 See note 36 supra.
47 Id.
48 On August 5, 1980, S. 3013 was introduced at President Carter's behest. This bill would have
permitted "Cuban/Haitian entrants," at the Attorney General's discretion, to adjust their status after two
years of physical presence in the United States. Senator Edward Kennedy introduced a substitute meas-
ure (Amendment No. 1962) which would have had substantially the same effect. 126 CONG. REc. S 12825-
829 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1980).
49 The basis of this concern is ably presented in Teitelbaum, Right Versus Right.- Immigration andRefugee
Policy in the United States , 59 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 21-59 (Fall 1980).
50 Tensions in Miami, Florida and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas have received extensive media coverage.
Each of the major television networks devoted segments of their nightly news programs to the disturbances
at Fort Chaffee. Stories in Time and Newsweek, initially favorable to asylum-seeking Cubans on their
"voyage to freedom" (see, e.g.,Sea Lzd2from Cuba to Key West, NEWSWEEK, May 5, 1980, at 59), laid increas-
ing emphasis on the "chaos created by the sudden influx" (Open Heart, Open Amu, TiME, May 19, 1980, at
[April 19811
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1980, when special authorizing legislation was passed, federal reimbursement to
states for aid extended to "Cuban/Haitian entrants" was entirely ad hoc and
more limited than the reimbursement allowed under the 1980 Act.5 '
Sheer numbers of refugees, an asylum system overloaded by "boat people"
and an economically hardpressed citizenry displaying increasingly "nativist" atti-
tudes all spell serious trouble for the 1980 Act. Not only is its implementation
hampered; its continued political acceptability is seriously threatened. Yet the
Act marks the nation's first attempt to deal systematically with an immense inter-
national problem, 52 and brings domestic refugee admission standards into line
with those prevailing in most Western democracies since 195153 and binding on
the United States under international law since 1968. 54 By emphasizing humani-
tarian rather than political criteria for admission, the 1980 Act has the potential
to focus the nation's generosity on those fearful of imprisonment, torture, or exe-
cution abroad. However, such potential can be realized only if the Act can be
made to work. Answering the three questions posed at the beginning of this arti-
cle will go a long way toward determining whether the 1980 Act can be made to
work.
II. Controlling Asylee Admission
A. Statutory Provisions and International Obi'gations
Individuals seeking asylum (asylees) have available to them several distinct,
but not entirely separate, options. They may seek statutory asylum under INA
section 208, seek statutory withholding of deportation under INA section
243(h),5 5 or appeal to the treaty obligations the United States has assumed under
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 56
14), "the rapidly growing backlash" (The Cuban Tide Is A Flood, NEWSWEEK, May 19, 1980, at 29), and
"[riefugees on the rampage" (Impatientfor Freedom, TIME, June 16, 1980, at 29).
Tensions involving Indochinese refugees have been less severe, and less widely reported. Antagonism
in Denver between Vietnamese and Hispanics in 1979 was given some network coverage. More recent
tension between the same groups in Los Angeles has gone largely unreported.
51 The President shall exercise authorities with respect to Cuban and Haitian entrants which
are identical to the authorities which are exercised under [INA §§ 411-414 (amended 1980) (to
be codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1522-1524)] . . . . The authorizations provided [by INA § 414
(amended 1980) (appropriations necessary for provision of initial resettlement assistance, cash
and medical assistance, and child welfare services)] . . . shall be available to carry out this
section without regard to the dollar limitation contained in [INA § 414(a)(2) (amended 1980)]
Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980 § 501(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 96-422, 94 Stat. 1799, 1809. Before this
authorization was issued, all payments made to cover the expenses of Cuban and Haitian entrants were ad
hoc and made under a broad interpretation of presidential authority. See Presidential Determination Nos.
80-16, 80-18, 80-24, 45 Fed. Reg. 28079, 29787, 62007 (1980).
52 There are "13-16 million officially designated refugees" in the world. Teitelbaum, supra note 49, at
44. Experts at a conference on the "Transactional Legal Problems of Refugees," held at the University of
Michigan on January 30-31, 1981, agreed that the unofficial number is considerably higher.
53 Signatories of the 1951 Convention, supra note 3, included, inter alia, Belgium, Denmark, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom.
54 See note 3 supra.
55 The 1980 revisions of INA § 243(h) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)), by adopting language
qualifying the circumstances under which the Attorney General may "deport or return" (emphasis added)
an alien, has made the withholding provision applicable to exeludees as well as deportees. This change is
reflected in the new regulations. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.3(b), 208.10(l) (1981) (asylum claims synonymous or
not synonymous with claims requesting withholding of "exclusion or deportation").
56 Under prior regulations, the right of individual asylum seekers to assert rights set forth in articles 32
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INA section 208(a)57 vests authority to grant asylum in the Attorney Gen-
eral. By regulation, the authority to grant aslyum is vested in the district director
of the INS, an immigration judge, or both. In each instance, however, the Bu-
reau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (B.H.R.H.A.) of the State De-
partment is afforded the right to render an "advisory opinion." 58  The
regulations provide for an initial hearing before the district director 59 if exclusion
or deportation hearings have not been initiated.60 Claimants at any port of en-
try; including those at land borders, may appear before the district director
rather than receive an immediate exclusion hearing. Extension of the pre-exclu-
sion hearing right to all applicants at ports of entry signals a significant departure
from prior law.6 ' Extension of such a right also accords with Congress's intent
that uniform procedures be established permitting "all asylum applicants an op-
portunity to have their claims considered outside a deportation and/or exclusion
proceeding, provided the order to show cause has not been issued."'62 Claimants
already involved in exclusion or deportation proceedings may still raise their asy-
lum claims in exclusion or deportation hearings before an immigration judge.63
Technically distinct from the statutory asylum provisions are provisions
granting "withholding of deportation"-or withholding of exclusion in the case
of aliens deemed to be "at the gates" rather than physically present in the United
States.64 As under earlier regulations, an application for withholding of exclu-
sion or deportation under INA section 243(h) is treated as a request for asylum,
and must be brought during the exclusion or deportation hearing. 65 Any person
failing to raise an asylum claim during the hearing may have the hearing re-
opened to consider the asylum claim only if she can "reasonably explain the fail-
ure to request asylum prior to the completion of [the original hearing]."'66 As
under earlier regulations, the applicant's claim will be evaluated pursuant to ad-
visory opinions rendered by B.H.R.H.A. 6 7 However, under the new regulations,
the district director is denied authority to rule on claims "clearly meritorious or
clearly lacking in substance" without first requesting B.H.R.H.A. advisory opin-
ion.6
8
Asylum applicants and applicants for withholding of deportation and exclu-
sion must demonstrate they are in fact "refugees." INA section 101(a)(42)(A)
defines a "refugee" as
and 33 of the 1951 Convention, supra note 3, as applicable through accession to the 1967 Protocol, supra
note 3, was set forth explicitly. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 108.2, .3 (1979) (withdrawn).
57 "The Attorney General shall establish a procedure ... to apply for asylum, and the [applicant]
alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines
that such an alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A)." INA § 208(a) (amended
1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158).
58 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1-.15 (1981).
59 In actual practice, all such interviews are conducted by designated agents of the district director,
who vary from region to region.
60 8 C.F.R. § 208.3 (1981).
61 Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 108.1 (1979) (no pre-exclusion hearing right).
62 125 CONG. REC. S12008 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
63 8 C.F.R. § 208.3, .10 (1981).
64 See Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980).
65 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b), .10 (1981).
66 8C.F.R.§208.11 (1981).
67 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1981).
68 Compare 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1981) with 8 C.F.R. § 108.1 (1979).
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any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a
person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitu-
ally resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling
to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion ....
Section 101(a)(42)(B) includes within the refugee definition certain persons fear-
ful of persecution still within their country of origin. 6 9 The section 101(a)(42)
definition applies directly to those seeking statutory asylum. INA section
243(h), however, also defines "refugee" to the extent withholding is available
only if "the Attorney General determines that [an applicant's] life or freedom
would be threatened ... . on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion." 70 Despite slight differences
between INA sections 101(a)(42) and 243(h), and despite pre-1980 case law dis-
tinguishing withholding of deportation from asylum, 7' Congress clearly intended
that no substantive distinction be made under the 1980 Act in determining eligi-
bility for either.
The interchangability of asylum and withholding of deportation results
largely from the fact that the present asylum section was designed, and the pres-
ent withholding section was revised, to meet the obligations imposed by the
United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the status of Refugees. 72
As modified by the Protocol, the Convention contains a refugee defintion sub-
stantially identical to the definition in INA section 101 (a) (42) (A).73 Although it
69 INA § 101(a)(42)(B) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B)) includes within
its refugee definition:
[I]n such special circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation. . . may specify,
any person who is within the country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, within the country in which such person is habitually residing, and who
is persecuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution [for the reasons enumerated in
§ 101(a)(42)(A)].
70 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. 1978).
71 See, e.g., Fleurinor v. INS, 545 F.2d 129, 134-35 (5th Cir. 1978):
Deportable aliens who seek to remain in the country have at least two legal options available to
them. First, they may apply for asylum ....
The second option is a petition for withholding a deportation under § 243(h) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). A "feared persecution" claim under § 243(h)
of the Act is entirely different from an "asylum claim," [see Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1035,
1059-60 (2d Cir. 1976)]. .. in that the former is part and parcel of the deportation proceeding.
An asylum claim, on the other hand, can obviate the need for any deportation proceedings at
all.
72 H.R. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 9
(1979); S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1979).
73 The 1951 Convention, supra note 3, defines a "refugee" as a person who
[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term "the country of his
nationality" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be
deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason
based an well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries
of which he is a national.
1951 Convention, supra note 3, art. 1, § A(2).
Article I, § 2 of the 1967 Protocol, supra note 3, removes all reference to events occurring before
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contains no provision for asylum as that term is defined in current United States
law, 74 the Convention does state that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or re-
turn ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. ' 75 This
provision is the source of the current language of INA section 242(h)(1). The
scope of the Convention provision is limited by aproviso which states:
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 76
Section 243(h)(2) contains a similar, although arguably broader, provso:
[The prohibition against denying withholding of deportation or exclusion] shall not
apply to any alien if the Attorney General determines that-
(A) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecu-
tion of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion;
(B) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious
crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States;
(C) there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has committed a seri-
ous nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in the
United States; or
(D) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the secur-
ity of the United States. 77
INA section 208, controlling the grant of statutory asylum, contains no suchpro-
vzso. However, the regulations provide for denial of asylum if the applicant (1)
"is not a refugee within the meaning of section 101 (1)(42) of the act,"' 78 (2) "[h]as
been firmly resettled in a foreign country, ' 79 (3) is subject to "an outstanding
offer of resettlement by a third nation, [provided that] resettlement in a third
nation is in the public interest," 80 or (4) falls within any of the four conditions of
the section 243(h) proviso.81
Because the substantive provisions of the Convention and Protocol are bind-
ing on the United States as a treaty obligation,8 2 the fact that the Convention
proviso is clearly more limited than that of the INA section 208 regulations and
may be more limited than that of INA section 243(h) is likely to lead to future
interpretation problems and litigation. However, the general parallelism of the
asylum, withholding of deportation and exclusion, and article 33 non-refoulment
provisions suggests a legal standard under which any alien who is presently in the
January 1, 1951, making the definition applicable to those fearful of persecution because of events occur-
ing anywhere in the world at any time.
74 ee note 4 supra.
75 1951 Convention, supra note 3, art. 33, § 1 (italics added).
76 Id., art. 33, § 2.
77 INA § 243(h)(2) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)).
78 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(0(1)(i) (1981).
79 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(0(1)(ii) (1981).
80 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(0(2)(1981).
81 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(0(1)(iii)-(vi) (1981).
82 19 U.S.T. 6223 (1968), T.I.A.S. No. 6577. Prior asylum regulations gave applicants the right to
assert their claims under the provisions of articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 Convention, supra note 3. Se 8
C.F.R. §§ 108.2, .3 (1979).
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United States and not a criminal or human rights violator can assert a claim for
protection.
B. Problems with Implementing the Right of Asylum
When the 1980 Act was introduced, its proponents believed the number of
applicants for asylum in any year would not exceed 5,000.83 This figure ex-
ceeded the number of applicants in any year under the regulations in effect from
1974 to 1979.84 Provisions in the new Act permitting the Attorney General to
adjust asylees' status to that of "permanent resident" incorporated the 5,000
limit. 85 However, in 1980, some 130,000 Cubans, 11,000 Haitians, and perhaps
15,000 Salvadorans, Ethiopians, Iranians, and Nicaraguans either entered the
United States as potential asylum seekers or applied for asylum.8 6 Given the
current unrest in the Caribbean and Latin America, it is likely that for the fore-
seeable future 45,000-50,000 potential asylees will continue to arrive in the
United States each year.87
In recognizing international standards for protecting asylum applicants
while projecting an unrealistically low level of refugee flow, the 1980 Act failed to
establish a bureaucracy capable of handling the applicants or potential appli-
cants arriving in 1980 or in the future. An administrative breakdown has oc-
curred in INS's initial processing of applications and in the State Department's
issuance of "advisory opinions." Further breakdowns are likely to occur as re-
jected applicants seek judicial review of their applications in federal courts. 88
Some of the breakdowns are legally significant because they cause delays
which may impair applicants' due process rights. Six months after their arrival
in the United States, most Haitian and Cuban boat people either had not filed
asylum applications8 9 or had not had their applications processed. 90 Yet unless
the agency evaluating individual claims is expanded and made significantly more
efficient, the prospects for speeding processing of claims is not bright.9 '
Other breakdowns have raised questions about the fundamental fairness of
83 Interview with an officer in the State Department, Washington, D.C., conducted by the author and
Gilburt D. Loescher (May 18, 1980).
84 Id. However, in another interview conducted at the State Department by the author and Gilburt
D. Loescher (May 18, 1980), it was revealed that over 19,000 asylum claims were pending as of November
30, 1979. That figure suggests that refugee flow increased dramatically after the 1980 Act was reported in
1979.
85 INA § 209(b) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c)).
86 For information as to Cubans and Haitians, see notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text. Statistics
about other potential asylum seekers are not precise, but are based upon unpublished INS memoranda
and statements made in Washington by State Department and INS personnel to the author and Gilburt
D. Loescher.
87 See J. Scanlan and G. Loeseher, Mass Asylum and American Foreign Policy (1981) (unpublished).
88 The asylum provisions of the 1980 Act have not yet been tested. Successful attacks on the proce-
dures employed under prior law have halted all processing of Haitian asylum claims in the Southern
District of Florida. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980); Sannon v.
United States, 460 F. Supp. 458 (S.D. Fla. 1978); Sannon v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Fla.
1977).
89 Interviews conducted in Miami by the author of INS officials (Aug. 6, 1980). Subsequent commu-
nications with attorneys closely involved with the processing of asylum claims suggest that few such claims
have actually been heard since August, 1980.
90 See notes 88-89 supra.
91 Even if claims are resolved, continued incarceration of denied applicants may raise serious legal
questions requiring immediate action. A recent district court decision has ruled indefinite incarceration in
such circumstances illegal. See Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980).
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the asylum decisionmaking process. The burden of showing a "well-founded fear
of persecution" rests on the individual applicant, 92 although nothing in the law
or practice of other asylum granting countries prohibits presumptions supporting
a finding of persecution if certain human rights violations are endemic to a na-
tion.93 Although it is entrusted with the duty of evaluating individual asylum
claims, 9 4 the INS is required to seek an "advisory opinion" from the State De-
partment in every case. 95 Most INS agents' lack of knowledge about human
rights conditions abroad and lack of formal training in asylum law96 raise serious
questions about their ability to adequately process asylum applications. In one
federal judge's view, the INS's failure to follow its own operating instructions
during the 1978 "Haitian Program" resulted in a systematic rejection of all Hai-
tian asylum applications 9 7 and a systematic denial of all Haitian applicants' due
process rights. 98 As a result, all INS operations in Miami involving Haitians
were placed under close judicial supervision. 99
Questions must also be raised about the State Department's practices for
somewhat different reasons. Because those in the State Department advising the
INS have access to considerable information about human rights conditions
abroad, they have at least a general knowledge of patterns of persecution in par-
ticular countries. Yet the sheer volume of current applications makes it impossi-
ble for the State Department to process claims individually rather than by
country.10 0 In making broad recommendations based on conditions in particular
countries, the State Department tends to emphasize its primary commitment to
furthering United States foreign policy objectives and maintaining good relations
with allies and trading partners, and thus to minimize humanitarian concerns.
This emphasis is particularly strong because in most instances an advisory opin-
ion is not issued until after the applicant's claim has passed through B.H.R.H.A.
and been processed by the State Department officer responsible for the particular
country or region involved. Thus, in the past asylum has been authorized be-
cause of the United States' political differences with the country of refugee origin,
92 8 C.F.R. § 208.5 (1981).
93 The United Nations' guidelines for evaluating asylum claims clearly provide for the use of pre-
sumptive group determinations. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 13 (1979).
See also I A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 145-50 (Leyden:
1971).
94 The asylum procedures mandated by § 204(d)(2) of the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-218,
94 Stat. 102, 108, are by law established by the Attorney General, under whose authority the INS operates.
Despite this fact, refugee admissions have been an interagency concern for a considerable period of time.
95 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7, .10(b) (1981).
96 Interviews with INS officials by the author in Washington, D.C. (June 5, 1980) and Miami, Florida
(Aug. 6, 1980).
97 Record at 138-39, Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
98 Id. at 139.
99 As a result of the decision in Sannon, the INS has been under court order to afford all Haitians
applying for asylum in the Southern District of Florida the names of attorneys who will protect their due
process rights. After Sannon and Haitian Refugee Center, neither excludees nor deportees in that district can
be summarily expelled from the United States.
100 The presence of one INS officer in B.H.R.H.A. responsible for handling all asylum claims meant
that during the peak of the Haitian and Cuban migration, thousands of files sat unopened in the State
Department for months. After a cursory review in B.H.R.H.A., they were automatically referred to the
relevant regional desks. Even before the onset of the crisis, some 19,000 asylum cases were pending. Inter-
view with State Department officer in Washington, D.C. conducted by the author and Gilburt D. Loe-
scher (May 18, 1980).
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even though particular claimants have had no colorable fear of persecution.'10
Likewise, even after passage of the 1980 Act, asylum has been recommended
against in blanket fashion because of the State Department's desire not to under-
mine governments perceived as friendly.' 0 2 Although bad public policy and
technically not legal, granting asylum when the facts do not warrant it is not
likely to raise practical legal difficulties since neither those granted asylum nor
the government agencies involved are likely to pursue the issue in court.'0 3 Re-
fusing to recommend asylum when the facts do warrant it raises more difficulties,
since a disappointed applicant may be able to show either in a federal district 0 4
or circuit'0 5 court that a negative State Department recommendation constituted
a due process violation.
In Zamora v. Immigration and Naturalization Semice, 10 6 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the admissibility of State Department
recommendations unfavorable to particular aliens seeking withholding of depor-
tation in INS administrative proceedings. Although it found the appellants de-
portable on other grounds, the court took sharp issue with the practice of
admitting into evidence State Department recommendations purporting to ad-
dress the "adjudicative facts"' 0 7 upon which an individual claim might turn,
while presenting "little or nothing in the way of useful information about condi-
tions in the foreign country."' 08 According to the court, such conclusory nega-
tive recommendations deprive the appropriate administrative bodies of their
adjudicatory role and, "[p]articularly in the light of the difficulties confronting
the alien in proving his case, [may increase the] risk that such communications
will carry a weight they do not deserve."' 1 9 Recent blanket recommendations
that the INS refuse to grant asylum to residents of El Salvador, Iran1 10 and, until
very recently, Haiti suggest that the State Department still may not be fulfilling
its proper function in processing asylum applications.
C. Parole.: An Alternative to Asylum
The difficulties associated with determining the refugee status of large num-
bers of potential asylum applicants can be temporarily avoided by provisionally
admitting aliens who might claim asylum and delaying determination of their
101 For example, asylum claims by all aliens alleging they feared persecution if they returned to Poland
were automatically granted. Interviews with INS officials conducted by Gracia Berg (May 20, 1980).
102 According to a knowledgeable State Department source, no asylum applications by applicants from
El Salvador had been approved by the State Department. Interview conducted by Gilburt Loeseher (May
19, 1980). As of February 17, 1981, the United States had also refused to grant "extended voluntary
departure" to Salvadorans in the country seeking asylum.
103 It is by no means clear that any other potential plaintiff would have the interest in the outcome of
such a suit necessary for a court to find standing. But see Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (suit
brought by person issuing invitation to alien excluded from the United States).
104 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1976) (INA § 106(b)) does not permit those subject to exclusion to appeal a
negative administrative decision, but does permit an excludee denied asylum a habeas corpus hearing to
show denial of due process.
105 8 U.S.C. § 1l05a(a) (1976) (INA § 106(a)) permits a final administrative denial of withholding of
deportation to be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals.
106 534 F.2d 1055 (2d. Cir. 1976).
107 Id. at 1063, id'ng K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 7.02 at 413 (1958).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Interviews with INS and State Department officials conducted by the author and Gilburt D. Loe-
scher (May 18-19 and June 5, 1980).
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claims. Between April and June of 1980, when the majority of the Cuban boat
people arrived in Florida, the INS could not possibly determine which among
those arriving had been subjected to, or were fearful of, persecution in Cuba.
Even had the State Department or the INS intended to rubber-stamp automatic
denials of asylum for Cuban applicants, litigation then pending in the Southern
District of Florida involving Haitians rendered it extremely likely that mass deni-
als would be appealed to the courts.II Immediate resolution of new and pend-
ing Haitian claims was impractical for much the same reason, although evidence
suggests the government desired to deny the Haitian claims routinely.," 2 For
political reasons, President Carter did not choose to classify the new Cuban and
Haitian arrivals as statutory refugees under INA section 207(b). 113 Lacking any
other means of affording them a regular status, the President initially did noth-
ing. But on June 20, 1980, through the office of Ambassador Victor H. Palmieri,
the United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, President Carter issued a dec-
laration establishing the new status of "Cuban/Haitian entrant." 1 4 That status,
due to last six months" 15 but later extended six additional months, 1 6 resembles
administrative parole, under which over one million refugees were admitted to
the United States from 1956 to 1979.117
Parole is an administrative device permitting aliens conditional entry while
their ultimate legal status is determined." 8 When used at the Attorney General's
discretion to permit individuals who are not refugees to remain in the United
States and at liberty pending resolution of a temporary and unexpected situation
whereby the individuals are in the United States without a visa," 19 parole poses
few legal difficulties. However, when used to afford temporary residence to large
numbers of aliens possibly eligible to apply for asylum or able to seek statutory
refugee status by applying for it from abroad, parole may violate both the spirit
and the letter of the 1980 Act. Clearly, a violation exists if the government does
not deem the parole granted to be temporary, but instead uses it as a vehicle for
admitting potential asylum applicants as eventual permanent residents without
the necessity of determining the validity of their individual fear of persecution.
Calling parole a "special status" or transferring authority to grant parole to
someone other than the Attorney General-such as the Coordinator for Refugee
Affairs-will not avoid the legal difficulties associated with its improper use.
The legal difficulties associated with parole's improper use stem from a dis-
11l See Haitian Refugee v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980) for a discussion of the procedural
devices available to obtain judicial review of arbitrary INS action. See also Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055
(2d Cir. 1976).
112 As recently as April, 1980, the official position of the State Department was that all Haitians enter-
ing the United States came as "economic migrants," rather than "political refugees." See 126 CONG. REC.
S3961 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1980) (report of the U.S. Coordinator of Refugee Affairs to Congress). In Janu-
ary, 1980, the United States refused to accept as refugees a number of Haitian journalists expelled from
Haiti for clearly political reasons.
113 Such a course had been recommended by Senator Edward Kennedy in a May 20, 1980 letter to
President Carter, reprinted in 126 CONG. REC. S6436-37 (daily ed. June 26, 1980).
114 Announcement of Ambassador Victor H. Palmieri, U.S. Coordinator of Refugee Affairs (June 20,
1980).
115 Id.
116 See note 36 supra.
117 1,027,407 aliens had been paroled into the United States as refugees as of May 31, 1979-an aver-
age of 44,670 per year. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
118 Leng Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1957).
119 E. HARPER & F. AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNrrED STATEs 505 (3d ed. 1975).
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pute between the legislative and executive branches of government dating back
to the early 1960's. The dispute has assumed a new legal dimension since the
passage of the 1980 Act. The Attorney General's parole power was not originally
designed to accommodate refugee flow.120 But prior to the Act of October 3,
1965,121 a restrictive national origins quota system was in effect under the INA
which severely limited the immigrant slots available to those applying from most
countries, 122 and which made no special provisions for refugees. To admit Hun-
garians in the 1950's and Cubans in the early 1960's, the Eisenhower, Kennedy,
and Johnson administrations each employed parole to evade the strictures of the
INA. Congress was aware of the practice, and on a number of occasions regis-
tered its tacit approval, either by passing subsequent legislation adjusting parol-
ees' status to that of permanent resident 123 or by authorizing the resettlement of
individuals whom the United Nations determined to be refugees and entering the
United States as parolees. 124 Yet congressional spokesmen instrumental in draft-
ing the INA registered concern that parole was being used in a manner not in-
tended by Congress-that it had become a vehicle for large-scale admissions not
otherwise authorized by statute.' 25
Congress abolished the national origins quota system in 1965. The subse-
quent formula established an overall quota for Eastern Hemisphere admis-
sions, 126 permitted up to 20,000 annual admissions from any country in the
Eastern Hemisphere, 12 7 and, for the first time, set aside a specific percentage of
the hemispheric total for individuals meeting an implied refugee definition. 128
Speaking on the floor of Congress, Senator Edward Kennedy, the bill's floor
manager, indicated that the new refugee provision (the "seventh preference")129
was meant to be exclusive and that refugee admission figures would not be fur-
ther inflated through the use of parole.130 These sentiments were eghoed in the
House Report.' 3 ' Reflecting these concerns, the statute as enacted repealed ear-
120 Id. at 504-10.
121 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976).
122 Prior to amendment, INA § 201(a) provided that for any "quota area," immigration be restricted
to one-sixth of one percent of the number of inhabitants from that area in the continental United States in
1920. 66 Stat. 163 (1952). The quota was less generous for those from the "Asia-Pacific Triangle." Each
quota area was entitled to a minimum of 100 allotted slots. Id.
123 Act of Aug. 21, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-700, 72 Stat. 694 (adjustment of status for Hungarians); Act of
Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (adjustment of status for Cubans); Act of Oct. 28, 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-145, 91 Stat. 1233 and Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907 (adjustment of
status for Indochinese).
124 In 1960, the United States agreed to accept one-quarter of the refugees still without permanent
asylum in Europe. Act of July 14, 1960, 74 Stat. 504 ("Fair Share Refugee Act"). See also Migration and
Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-510, 76 Stat. 121 (repealed by Act of Oct. 3, 1965).
125 Set, e.g., Hearings on H.J. Res. 397 before Subcomm. No. / ofthe HouseJudicia7 Comm., 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 45 (1960) (remarks of Rep. Feighan) quoted in E. HARPER & F. AUERBACH, supra note 11, at 505.
126 Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 1, 79 Stat. 911.
127 Id. § 2, 79 Stat. 911, 911-12.
128 INA § 207(a)(3) (repealed) was available to those who had departed a "communist dominated"
area of the "general area of the Middle East" because of "persecution or fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, or political opinion." Id., 79 Stat. 913.
129 INA § 203(a) originally contained six preferences allocating percentages of the annual immigration
limit on a priority basis to aliens related to United States citizens and residents or possessing certain job
skills. A seventh preference, INA § 203(a)(7) (repealed), alloted six percent of the annual limit to refugees,
who were, however, only admissible as conditional entrants.
130 See, e.g., 11 CONG. REC. 24227 (1965) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
131 H. REP. No. 745, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1965), citedin E. HARPER & F. AuERBACH, supra note 11,
at 507.
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lier legislation obligating the United States to "parole in" certain aliens the
United Nations deemed to be refugees, 132 although it retained the language of
the parole provision itself.
Even as the 1965 legislation was being signed, however, a new influx of
Cubans was beginning. Many Cubans were not eligible to become immigrants
under the new restrictions placed on Western Hemisphere immigration.13 3 The
Johnson administration responded by "paroling in" over 168,000 Cubans and by
seeking special legislation permitting these parolees to adjust their status to that
of permanent resident.' 34 Congress obliged. 135 Congress also obliged in 1976,
1978, and 1979 when similar requests were made to permit other Western Hemi-
sphere and Indochinese refugees to adjust their status.t 36 Yet as the handling of
the Indochinese migration and the smaller migrations of Ugandans and Soviet
Jews all illustrate, congressional acceptance of parole as an admissions device was
tempered with concern that the President could unilaterally employ parole to
evade all INA limitations regardless of prevailing political sentiment. In han-
dling the parole decisions involving all these groups, the President and ranking
members of the House and Senate judiciary committees consulted informally,
and Congress approved the parole decisions actually reached. 1
37
It is in the context of this history that the parole provisions of the 1980 Act
must be analyzed, and their relevance to the Cuban/Haitian entrant designation
evaluated. Despite some of the liberal features of the 1965 Act, the seventh pref-
erence-which permitted only 10,200 annual refugee admissions when first en-
acted and only 17,400 when it went out of existencel 3 8-- could not handle the
large numbers of refugees seeking admission and having some claim on United
States generosity. The 20,000 persons per country ceiling on annual admissions
constituted another statutory barrier to a more generous national refugee policy
reflecting the will of the President, the Congress and (to a limited extent) the
American people. 139 Parole, adequately overseen by Congress and followed by
adjustment of status legislation, was perceived as a necessary but legally suspect
method of implementing a generous refugee policy.
The 1980 Act was designed to provide more direct means of meeting policy
132 Id.
133 Those restrictions did not go into effect until June 30, 1968. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
236, § 21, 79 Stat. 911, 920-21.
134 These Cubans were part of a larger flow which had reached nearly 700,000 by mid-1979. See J.
Scanlan & G. Loescher, Admission of Refugees and Asylees under the Law C0-24; CC-26-29 (Report to
the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 1980) (unpublished).
135 Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1611 (adjustment of status for Cubans).
136 See note 123, supra.
137 E. HARPER & F. AUERBACH, supra note 11, at 508-09. The account given there is supported by
recent interviews with State Department officials conducted by the author and Gilburt D. Loescher.
138 Initially, the seventh preference applied only to Eastern Hemisphere refugees. The preference sys-
tem was not in effect with respect to Western Hemisphere applicants. The Act of October 20, 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703, applied both preferences and country limitations to Western Hemisphere
applicants. The Western Hemisphere ceiling, in effect since 1968, was not used prior to 1976 in determin-
ing the seventh preference "quota."
139 The most extensive attitudinal survey on refugee admission prior to the passage of the 1980 Act was
a Roper poll conducted in September, 1979. That poll indicated substantial support for lowering (46%
approval), rather than raising (12% approval), the number of Indochinese refugees admitted, primarily on
the grounds that refugees were "too great an economic burden" (37% agreement) and that the "needy in




objectives and to close the loophole under which large numbers of people had
been admitted to the United States without regard to the strict provisions of the
law. By redefining "refugee" to conform to international standards, the 1980 Act
eliminated questions about the admissibility of persons subject to persecution in
countries not in the Middle East or under communist domination. By allowing
an entirely separate, flexible annual quota for refugees applying from abroad, the
1980 Act permits large-scale refugee admissions if they are deemed to be in the
national interest. By establishing a method for revising the annual refugee
quota, the 1980 Act established a means of responding quickly to "emergency
situations." 140 And by requiring that all refugee quota numbers be subject to
congressional review through a statutorily-defined "consultation" process 14 1
before being allocated among refugee "sender" nations, 142 the 1980 Act formal-
ized congressional input that had been customary, but not required, under the
former parole regime.
The 1980 Act thus eliminated the reasons for using parole for long-term
entry of large refugee groups. As the Senate Report states, one of the 1980 Act's
purposes was to replace "adhoc" decisions made "through the use of the 'parole
authority' in" the INA with decisions based on new statutory procedures.14 3 To-
ward that end, Congress added to INA section 212(d) (5) a new proviso, which
states:
The Attorney General may not parole into the United States an alien who is a refu-
gee unless the Attorney General determines that compelling reasons in the public
interest with respect to that particular alien require that the alien be paroled into the
United States rather than be admitted as a refugee under section 207.144
As the reference to admissibility "under section 207"--which controls ordi-
nary applications from abroad-indicates, it was never contemplated by the
drafters of this proviso that parole would be used to admit applicants already in
the country. Since the new statutory language was designed to abolish unregu-
lated large-scale refugee admissions, and since prior to April, 1980 the only exam-
ples of such admissions involved the parole of aliens making application from
abroad, the failure of section 212(d) (5) to address directly the situation of asylum
applicants does not mean that its limitations do not apply to entrants technically
admissible as asylees under section 208. Asylum and withholding of deportation
questions have always been processed on an individual basis, although the stan-
dards for granting either status have frequently been less particular. Thus, the
"particular alien" requirement imposed by the 1980 Act is less onerous in the
context of ordinary refugee processing, since ordinary refugees applying for ad-
mission from abroad usually belong to groups which the United States already
presumes to consist entirely of refugees. Refugees applying from abroad are thus
scrutinized less intensively regarding their personal grounds for seeking refuge. 145
140 See INA § 207(b) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b)).
141 See id. § 207(d), (e).
142 Technically, the President's decision to admit up to 50,000 refugees per year is not subject to the
consultation requirement under current law. But the allocation of these slots to refugees from particular
countries is. Compare id. § 207(a)(1) with id. § 207(a)(3).
143 S. REP. No. 256 96th Cong., 1st Ses. 1 (1979).
144 INA § 212(d)(5)(B) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(B)).
145 Applicants in a third country seeking refuge are required to fill out an 1-590 form and to submit to
an interview during which the basis of their assertion of "well-founded fear" is examined. See 8 C.F.R.
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Because INA section 212(d)(5)(B) refers only to "refugee" aliens and is not in-
tended to affect the Attorney General's authority 146 to parole aliens not deemed
to be refugees,' 4 7 potential asylum applicants whose claims have not been evalu-
ated and whose refugee status has not been determined are not technically cov-
ered by its provisions. This technical position assumes, however, that the
President has unlimited statutory power to parole large numbers of aliens, even if
their basis for entry is fear of persecution, so long as the basis of this fear is not
examined. Such a view is untenable in light of the 1980 Act's clear intent to
bring every applicant--except in rare, individually determined instances 48-
within the scope of section 207's screening and allocation procedures or section
208's asylum provisions.
Unfortunately, the INA does not contain any statutorily defined status for
asylum applicants who are physically present in the United States while their
claims are processed. Serious differences about policy stand in the way of defin-
ing that status. Some advocate that such aliens should be granted work authori-
zation, full social service benefits, and the liberty associated with parole. 149
Others urge the adoption of a system now being tried in West Germany, whereby
all asylum applicants are detained pending determination of their claims.' 5 0
Lacking any defined statutory status, asylum applicants still in process and po-
tential asylum applicants who have not yet filed their claims create significant
budgetary and social service difficulties for the communities and states into
which they migrate. Representatives of such communities and states turn to the
federal government for help. 51 The Carter administration's decision to create
the "Cuban/Haitian entrant" status can be traced to this type of political pres-
sure, and to the need to stabilize the situation presented by more than 140,000
Cubans and Haitians occupying a legal limbo. Given the tremendous burdens
on the INS during the spring and summer of 1980, it is understandable and per-
haps inevitable that the functional equivalent of parole should have been
granted, despite its apparent illegality to the Haitian and Cuban boat people on
a temporary basis. Congressional acquiescence in the grant' 5 2 suggests no better
§ 207.1-.7 (1981). The form requires little information. The result of the interview is usually predictable,
since such applicants belong to groups already identified as being composed of refugees. The focus of
screening is on such factors as whether the applicant has close relatives in the United States or was for-
merly employed by the United States government, which will determine the refugee's place on rank-order
waiting lists. Asylum screening, which requires submission of an 1-589 form and may also require an
appearance before an immigration judge (see 8 C.F.R. § 208.1-. 15 (1981), is considerably more rigorous in
its inquiry into the basis of the asserted fear. In contrast with the 1-590 form, the 1-589 form contains fairly
detailed questions.
146 INA § 212(d)(5) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)).
147 H.R. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980).
148 See Conference Report, supra note 8, at 20.
149 Interview with Ron Scheinman, former coordinator of Refugee Research, Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policies, conducted by the author (June 5, 1980).
150 Interview with Klaus Feldman, Director of Assistance, United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees, conducted by the author (Sept. 13, 1980).
151 For example, lack of comprehensive federal aid to Dade County, Florida when the Cubans began
arriving in April, 1980 led to intensive pressure to have those arriving classified as refugees for the purpose
of aid. This pressure culminated in the passage of the Fascell-Stone Amendment (title V of the Refugee
Education Assistance Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-422, 94 Stat. 1799, 1809) authorizing federal aid to
Cuban-Haitian entrants on the same terms as statutory refugees. See 153 CONG. REc. H10,122 (daily ed.
Sept. 30, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Fascell).
152 In the weeks following the June 20, 1980 announcement of Ambassador Palmieri, supra note 46,




Yet legislation proposed by the Carter administration in the waning days of
the 96th Congress,1 53 if revived by the Reagan administration, will effectively
reinstitutionalize parole as a means of obtaining full immigrant status. The pro-
posed legislation treats "Cuban/Haitian entrants" as if they belonged to earlier
generations of refugee-parolees by granting them automatic adjustment to per-
manent resident status. Granting such status without any required screening will
severely undercut the 1980 Act and impede its objective of minimizing the
number of aliens choosing the United States as their country of first asylum.
D. Statutoy Refuge as an Alternative to Asylum
Although technically "conditional entrants," refugees admitted under the
INA section 207 statutory allocation process are automatically eligible to adjust
their status to that of permanent resident after one year of physical presence in
the United States. 154 As refugees, they are entitled to all of the benefits provided
in title III, part B of the 1980 Act,' 55 assuming their state of residence has
adopted a qualified plan. 156
In the usual case, such persons' status as refugees will have been determined
before they enter the United States. However, there is no absolute statutory bar
to granting an applicant section 207 status after his arrival, since that section does
not prohibit the practice and since the basic refugee definition under INA section
101(a) (42) (A) specifies only that the applicant must be outside the country of his
"nationality" or, lacking a nationality, the country of his last habitual residence.
Taking advantage of this drafting loophole, Senator Edward Kennedy proposed
in a letter to President Carter dated May 20, 1980 that those Cubans who had
migrated to the United States from Mariel Bay should be treated similarly to
those who had migrated from the Peruvian embassy, and should be designated
section 207(b) refugees.' 57 On June 6, 1980, Senator Kennedy introduced legis-
lation which would have had this effect,15 8 and on August 5, 1980, Senator Ken-
nedy introduced a substitute to the bill proposed by the Carter administration
which would have granted "Cuban/Haitian entrants" permanent resident status
indirectly by designating all holding that status statutory refugees.1 59
For a number of reasons, recharacterizing potential asylum applicants as
24, 1980) (extension of remarks of Rep. McClory)), and in statements to the press (see, e.g., remarks attrib-
uted to Representative Chisholm and Senator Huddleston, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1980, at 1, col. 6). Yet
the statement of Congressman Fish which described the parole granted as "mak[ing] the best out of a bad
situation" was probably more typical. 126 CONG. REC. H5453 (daily ed. June 20, 1980). There was
certainly no great outcry in Congress protesting the grant, nor was any attempt made to rescind it. Ongo-
ing informal consultation on Cuban and Haitian admissions had been in effect from the outset of the
admissions crisis, primarily through hearings held in the Senate and House Judiciary Committees and
through communications with members of the White House staff.
153 S. 3013, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), which did not become part of the law. The bill was modeled
on earlier special adjustment of status legislation. 126 CONG. Rra. S10825-24 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1980).
154 INA § 209(a) (amended 1980) (to be codified at) 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)).
155 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212 § 311(a)(2), 94 Stat. 102 (adding §§ 411-414 to the INA)
(to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1521-1524).
156 Id. (adding § 412(a)(6) to the INA) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(6)).
157 See note 113 supra.
158 Id.
159 Amendment No. 1962 to S. 3013, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), 126 CONG. REC. S10828 (daily ed.
Aug. 5, 1980).
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either ordinary1 60 or "emergency situation"' 16 1 refugees is apparently more at-
tractive than characterizing them as parolees. To be admitted, statutory refugees
of either sort must fall within the refugee slots allocated for their country of ori-
gin. The President has the authority to create new slots in emergencies, but must
consult with Congress before doing so. ' 62 Admissions are either constrained by a
preexisting but flexible numerical limitation, or directly monitored but not con-
trolled by Congress. Granting statutory refugee status to potential asylum appli-
cants does not contravene clear legislative intent as does the grant of long-term
parole. Although statutory refugees must be reprocessed to obtain permanent
resident status, reprocessing is essentially pro fonna and ordinarily does not im-
pede the adjustment of particular aliens' status. ' 63 However, absent special legis-
lation, aliens granted asylum under INA section 208 will have a harder time
adjusting status, since such adjustment is within the discretion of the Attorney
General and only 5,000 slots per year are available to such adjustment.' 64 Fi-
nally, every statutory refugee is entitled to all of the benefits provided in title III,
part B of the Act, assuming a qualified state plan is in effect.' 65
Despite these attractive features, characterizing potential asylum applicants
as statutory refugees has a number of serious drawbacks. First, granting refuge
under section 207 presumes some prescreening abroad. Such prescreening in-
volves not only a determination of refugee status, but also a personal inventory of
the applicant's relatives in the United States, past associations with the United
States, and special humanitarian claims on United States hospitality. Even gen-
uine refugees must wait their turn until the allocation process makes an admis-
sions slot available.i 66 Declaring individuals not yet prescreened to be statutory
refugees multiplies the chances that individuals not fearful of persecution will be
admitted to the United States-certainly a real possibility in the case of many
current Cuban and Haitian boat people. Such a process also gives individuals
not yet prescreened a decided admissions advantage over those seeking refuge
through appropriate channels abroad. Second, the law should encourage orderly
refugee flow from holding areas outside the United States, rather than provide an
incentive for coming to the United States to seek asylum. The favorable status
adjustment privileges afforded statutory refugees will not provide any disincen-
tive to those arriving in the United States as potential asylees if they have reason
to believe they may be reclassified as statutory refugees. Third, by granting stat-
utory refuge rather than parole, its administrative equivalent, or some new in-
terim legal status, essentially permanent decisions will be made about potential
asylum applicants even though public policy may demand that such decisions be
postponed. Parole, at least, can be limited to some set period of time, such as six
months, while statutory refuge is forever.
Although there are advantages to involving Congress directly in the admis-
sion of large numbers of asylum applicants by using section 207 procedures, these
160 INA § 207(a) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C..§ 1157(a)).
161 INA § 207(b) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b)).
162 Id.
163 Interview with Harry J. Klajbor, Deputy Assistant Commission, Adjudications, INS, conducted by
the author (June 5, 1980).
164 INA § 209(b) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)).
165 INA § 412(a)(6) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(6)).
166 8 C.F.R. § 207.5 (1981).
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advantages lie in greater congressional control of overall refugee numbers rather
than in greater congressional ability to curtail the flow of persons seeking asylum.
Relating ordinary allocation decisions for applicants seeking refuge from abroad
to the probable number of individuals seeking or likely to be granted asylum will
generate the best result. Using section 207 to avoid difficult asylum decisions will
likely increase the number of those decisions required in the future.
E. Recommendations for Refining the Asylum Process
Changes in the law cannot overcome the immense political and demo-
graphic pressures driving people to the borders of the United States to seek asy-
lum. Nor can changes in the law obviate the need for difficult policy decisions
about how to regulate overall refugee flow in a manner consistent with humani-
tarian, economic, and social goals. Nevertheless, changes suggested by this arti-
cle's analysis of asylum and its alternatives should make asylum procedures more
equitable and wdrkable, clarify the status of those awaiting asylum processing,
and insure that the selective nature of asylum is not diluted by administrative
expedients that increase rather than diminish the flow of asylum seekers.
1. INA section 212(d)(5)(B) should be amended to indicate explicitly that
parole is not available under any circumstances to individuals arriving in the
United States and filing asylum claims.
2. A new provision should be added to INA section 208 establishing a tem-
porary status for individuals arriving in the United States and filing asylum
claims. This provision should establish a time limit of no more than ninety days
for such status, extendable only by direct congressional action. This provision
should also specify the degree of freedom, job eligibility, and social service eligi-
bility of in-process asylum applicants. The benefits provided in-process appli-
cants should guarantee that state or local governments will not bear the burden
of in-process applicant support. Provision should also be made for temporarily
reinstituting this status for asylum applicants whose claims have been processed
and rejected, but who can not be physically repatriated to their country of origin
and will not be accepted by any nonpersecutorial third country.
3. A provision should be added to INA section 208 requiring the President
to "inform" Congress at regular intervals of the number of potential asylum seek-
ers physically present in the United States, the number likely to be granted asy-
lum, the number who may not be capable of repatriation, and the number likely
to arrive in the near future.
4. Possible disparities in interpreting INA sections 243(h) and 208 should
be eliminated by deleting section 243(h) (1) and integrating the exclusionary pro-
visions of section 243 (h) (2) into section 208. There is no present need for a sepa-
rate withholding of deportation or exclusion section when any individual eligible
for such withholding will also be eligible for statutory asylum.
5. Specific changes should be made in asylum procedures to permit a more
systematic and less political evaluation of applicants' assertions of "well-founded
fear of persecution." These changes should include replacement of current State
Department "advisory opinions" with file "profiles" of human rights conditions
in particular countries as they affect particular groups. To minimize political
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factors, such profiles should be generated outside the State Department16 7 and
should draw upon the input of interested human rights groups. The use of
profiles would allow factors common to a number of applicants to be evaluated
without generating "individual opinions" based on broad presumptions about
conditions abroad and their impact on United States foreign policy. Such
profiles would provide the asylum decisionmaker with better access to the "legis-
lative facts" noted in Zamora. Because the profiles would produce only general
information about conditions abroad and because the right to asylum is an indi-
vidual one, emphasis should be placed on the fact that the information they pro-
vide is "legislative" rather than "adjudicative." This emphasis could be provided
by specifically adding to the regulations language providing that asylum is a
personal right and that each applicant shall have the right to adduce evidence
supporting his asylum claim despite the absence of profile information lending
credibility to that claim. No changes in the INA itself would be necessary to
modify asylum procedures to this extent.
III. Controlling Admission of Those Seeking Statutory Refuge
A. Statutoy Provisions for Numerical Control
The 1980 Act created a new and exclusive procedure for admitting refugees
applying from outside the United States, and provided for congressional input
into admission decisions. Yet INA section 207, which controls such admissions,
grants principal decisionmaking power to the President by permitting him to
"determine" the number of refugees admitted annually168 and the allocation of
those refugee slots among the refugees of the world. 6 9 The President may also
"specify" which aliens still in their country of origin may be designated refu-
gees. 170 In each instance, the 1980 Act permits the President to act only after the
requisite "appropriate consultation" provisions are met.' 17  But the 1980 Act
provides no statutory recourse if such consultation is merely pro forma or entirely
absent.
The consultation provisions exist to make admission of aliens claiming ref-
uge from abroad more responsive to the domestic political process. In passing the
1980 Act, Congress sought flexibility, predictability, and executive accountabil-
ity. 1 72 By requiring that a baseline admission figure for "normal flow" refugees
be set after consultation between the President and Congress prior to the start of
the fiscal year,' 73 and by permitting revision of that figure to admit "emergency
situation" refugees after the start of a fiscal year only after further consulta-
167 The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, in its final report, recommended that
such profiles be used and that they be generated in the Office of the United States Coordinator for Refugee
Affairs. SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY & THE
NATIONAL INTEREST, xxii 169-171 (1981). For a fuller discussion of how such profiles can be generated
and used, see Scanlan and Loescher, supra note 134, at AB 1-7.
168 INA §§ 207(a)(1), (b) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(a)(1), (b)).
169 INA §§ 207(a)(2), (3) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(a)(2), (3)).
170 INA § 101(a)(42)(B) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B)).
171 For a technical exception, see note 16 supra.
172 See H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1979); S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1979).
173 As provided by INA § 207(a) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § I157(a)).
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tion, 74 the 1980 Act establishes a mechanism which promotes all of these goals.
The consultation provisions are set forth in INA sections 207(d) and (e).
Section 207(d) requires (1) a report by the President to the Senate and House
Judiciary Committees before the start of each fiscal year predicting refugee flow,
(2) periodic discussions among members of those committees and the President's
designated representatives, (3) a record of the results of such "consultation," to be
printed in the Congressional Record, and (4) a hearing "to review the proposed
determination . . . unless public disclosure of the details of the proposal would
jeopardize the lives or safety of individuals." 75 These requirements apply to
both "normal flow" and "emergency situation" refugees. Section 207(e) specifies
(1) that the discussions with the members of the judiciary committees must be
carried on by "Cabinet-level representatives of the President," and (2) that such
discussion must review the situation, project its costs, and set forth the basis for
belief "that the proposed admission of refugees is justified by humanitarian con-
cerns or grave humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national interest."
The subsection also requires that the following information be submitted by the
President's representative two weeks prior to any discussion "[t]o the extent possi-
ble":
(1) A description of the nature of the refugee situation.
(2) A description of the number and allocation of the refugees to be admitted and
an analysis of conditions within the countries from which they came.
(3) A description of the proposed plans for ... [the refugees'] movement and reset-
tlement and the estimated cost of their movement and resettlement.
(4) An analysis of the anticipated social, economic, and demographic impact of...
[the refugees'] admission to the United States.
(5) A description of the extent to which other countries will admit and assist in the
resettlement of such refugees.
(6) An analysis of the impact of the participation of the United States on the for-
eign policy interests of the United States.
(7) Such additional information as may be appropriate or requested by such mem-
bers. '
76
These provisions will provide Congress detailed advance information about
refugee flow. They should also alleviate some of the difficulties of continual ad
hoc refugee decisionmaking and provide an adequate data base for implementing
title III, part (B) of the 1980 Act. Although they do not impose congressionally
determined refugee allocations on the President or a one House veto of the Presi-
dent's own determinations, 77 the provisions will have the practical effect of con-
straining the President from making unilateral refugee decisions, provided he
does not try to avoid the provisions by using some parole variant.
B. Obligations toward Particular Refugees under Domestic and International Law
Although the United States has agreed to accept certain refugees from time
174 As provided by INA § 207(b) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. 1157(b)).
175 INA § 207(d)(3) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157(d)(3)).
176 INA § 207(e) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. & 115 7(e)).
177 A one House veto over presidential allocation on determinations was proposed in the version of the
Refugee Act introduced as H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., on March 13, 1979. The final House bill
deleted all reference to such a veto.
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to time,1 78 nothing in current domestic or international law obliges it to admit
any refugee applying from outside the United States. To paraphrase an interna-
tional maxim into language consistent with domestic law, no absolute right of
refuge exists.179 Should the President eliminate all INA section 207 refugee slots,
no alien applying for refuge from outside the United States would be admissible.
Even if refugee slots were available, no aliens applying from outside the country
would have a right to claim one. 18 0
Nevertheless, within the established annual admission limits, section 207
does provide loose standards limiting the class entitled to refuge, and thus creates
implicit preferences for other applicants. Section 207(a) requires that when con-
sultation is required before a numerical determination is made, the determina-
tion must be either "justified by humanitarian concerns" or "otherwise in the
national interest."'' Section 207(a) further requires that in allocating places to
persons designated refugees before the start of the fiscal year, a determination
must be made that such refugees are "of special humanitarian concern to the
United States."'8 2 Section 207(b), which deals with designations made after the
start of the fiscal year, requires that (1) all refugees designated at such a time be
involved in "an unforeseen emergency refugee situation," 18 3 (2) the President's
response to that situation be "justified by grave humanitarian concerns or [be]
otherwise in the national interest,"' 84 and (3) "the admission to the United States
of these refugees cannot be accomplished under [section 207(a)]."' 85
Since section 207 requires that each presidential determination involving
one of these conditions precedent be made only "after appropriate consultation,"
terms such as "justified by humanitarian concerns," "justified by grave humani-
tarian concerns," "of special humanitarian concern," and "otherwise in the na-
tional interest" will in most instances be defined in an exchange of views between
the legislative and executive branches. Such definitions will be responsive to a
particular set of circumstances and take into account both the persecution ele-
ment of section 101(a)(42) and the political pressures which favor responding
definitively to some instances of persecution and less definitively or not at all to
other instances. In enacting section 207, Congress wanted to avoid the strictures
which rendered all applicants not from communist dominated countries or from
178 Act of July 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 501 ("Fair Share Refugee Act"), authorized
refugees under the mandate of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees to enter the United
States as parolees. The total number "could not exceed twenty-five percent of the total number of similar
refugees resettled since July 1, 1959 in countries other than the United States and included 500 'difficult to
resettle' cases." E. HARPER & F. AUERBACH, supra note 11, at 31. The Migration and Refugee Assistance
Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-510, § 2, 76 Stat. 121, 124 extended the authority to assist U.N.-designated
refugees but did not specifically address the question of their admission.
179 Focusing on the rights of aliens outside a country to enter it in order to flee persecution, and em-
ploying the international-as opposed to American-vocabulary, commentators frequently assert that
there is no absolute right of asylum. For a discussion of that doctrine and its limits, see G. GOODWIN-GILL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN STATES 137-42 (1978).
180 A consular officer has unreviewable authority to deny a visa. See IA C. GORDON & H. ROSEN-
FIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.8(b) (1980). See also id. § 2.2(a) (excluded aliens have
scant basis on which to contest Congress's exercise of its power to exclude).
181 INA § 207(a)(1) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § I157(a)(1)).
182 INA § 207(a)(3) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3)).
183 INA § 207(b)(1) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b)(1)).
184 INA § 207(b)(2) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)).
185 INA § 207(b)(3) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)).
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the Middle East statutor,y ineligible for the seventh preference.'8 6 Yet rather
than commit itself to avoiding political considerations entirely, Congress tem-
pered political considerations with a new humanitarian emphasis.
Thus, the House Report indicated both that the insertion of the word "hu-
manitarian" into the Act was intended "to emphasize that the plight of the refu-
gees themselves, as opposed to national origins or political considerations, should
be paramount in determining which refugees are to be admitted to the United
States"1 8 7 and that the new refugee definition "does not create a new and ex-
panded means of entry, but instead. . . formalizes the policies and the practices
that have been followed in recent years." 188 Continued reliance on criteria tradi-
tionally employed to determine which refugees ought to be admitted to the
United States was among the policies specifically approved by both houses. In
glossing the term "special humanitarian concern," the House placed primary em-
phasis on "the pattern of human rights violation in the country of origin," and
less emphasis on such considerations as family, historical, cultural, religious, or
treaty ties. 189 However, in glossing the term "special concern," the Senate placed
primary emphasis on the historical, cultural, or treaty ties generating that con-
cern, and less emphasis on such considerations as the promotion of family reun-
ion, the response to human rights concerns, and the fulfillment of foreign policy
interests. 190 The use of the House language in section 207(a) (3) suggests that the
House list of priorities is more authoritative. Yet, although both "special con-
cern" and "special humanitarian concern" were glossed in the Senate and House
Reports respectively, neither term was deemed to have a set definition. Accord-
ing to the House Report:
The legislation does not-and cannot-further define this phrase [of special humani-
tarian concern]. The Committee believes that any attempt to do so would unnecessa-
rily restrict future public policy decisions. The Committee recognizes that
determining which refugees are of "special humanitarian concern" to the United
States will be a matter to be considered, debated and decided at the time refugee
situations develop. 19
Nearly identical language discussing "of special concern" appears in the Senate
Report. 192
Whether the "concern" that justifies allocating refugee slots to members of
particular groups is merely "special," or "special" and "humanitarian," much
leeway exists for the President-or for the President and Congress together if
"appropriate consultation" exists-in selecting admissible refugees. Despite this
leeway, however, only those in fact meeting the refugee definition, that is, having
"a well-founded fear of persecution" for any of the reasons specified in section
101 (a) (42), are in fact legally admissible.
The statutory language regulating the flow of "emergency situation" refu-
gees suggests that those eligible for admission under section 207(b) must meet a
186 H. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979).
187 Id. at 13.
188 Id. at 10. See also 125 CONG. REc. S12007 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1979) (statement of Sen. Edward
Kennedy).
189 H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1979).
190 S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979).
191 H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1979).
192 S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979).
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stricter test. Referring to its version of that subsection, the House Report indi-
cated:
The Committee Amendment requires that the admission of refugees under the
emergency flow provision be justified by "grave humanitarian concerns." This is a
stricter standard that that required for the admission of refugees under the normal
flow procedures, which must be warranted by "humanitarian concerns." The Com-
mittee intends by this stricter standard to limit the emergency admission procedures
to situations where the refugees' lives are placed in immediate jeopardy, where their
personal safety is threatened or where there is an imminent possibility of loss of free-
dom. 19
3
Yet the version drafted by the Senate and enacted into law may be less restric-
tive. In the Senate bill, emergency situation refugees are admissible if they are
the object of "grave humanitarian concern" or if their admission "is otherwise in
the national interest."' 194 As in the clause governing the determination of ordi-
nary refugee numbers, a disjunctive reference to the "national interest" provides
an apparent loophole. In the first instance, the loophole is illusory because allo-
cations of refugee slots still require a finding of "special humanitarian con-
cern." 19 5 However, in the second instance, the loophole is real: Under a strict
reading of the statute, "emergency situation" refugees are admissible if their situ-
ation is of "special" rather than "grave humanitarian concern," provided the
President deems such a result "in the national interest."'196
Such a loophole is not necessarily objectionable, however. There does not
appear to be any valid reason for making it more difficult for a refugee to obtain
admission to the United States merely because a new fiscal year has begun. 19 7
But the existence of such a loophole does suggest that terms like "grave humani-
tarian concern" having restrictive connotations may not always significantly re-
strict or control refugee flow. The distinction between "normal flow" and
"emergency situation" refugees thus may be more a matter of semantics than of
substance. For particular applicants not in immediate jeopardy, the insubstanti-
ality of the distinction may prove beneficial. Yet for applicants whose lives and
personal safety are threatened, in an era when annual allocations are likely to be
oversubscribed, the lack of a meaningful priority under the statutory admissions
criteria may prove disastrous.
IV. Conclusion: Recommendations for Coordinating Asylum
and Statutory Refuge
This article's asylum recommendations will rationalize and expedite the asy-
lum granting process and marginally decrease the number of asylum applicants
by making asylum status less attractive. But these recommendations will not
substantially affect the number of individuals arriving in the United States
before seeking refuge. Nor will these recommendations abolish obligations estab-
193 H.R. REP. No. 608, 96TH CONG., IST SEss. 12 (1979).
194 The Senate language is that adopted in the final bill. Neither the floor debate nor the Conference
Report offers any enlightenment as to why this phrasing was adopted.
195 INA § 207(a)(1) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(1)).
196 Id.
197 However, the budgeting process undoubtedly would be simplified if all admissions decisions were
made before the close of the preceding year.
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lished under both domestic and international law protecting those individuals
from refoulement if they establish the bonafide nature of their refugee claims. INA
section 208 asylum admissions will therefore remain substantial in the foreseeable
future.
In light of these facts, two changes in section 207 statutory refuge provisions
should be. adopted. Both changes will better coordinate ordinary refugee and
asylee admissions. The second change will also insure that the humanitarian
objectives of the 1980 Act are not overshadowed by political decisions affecting
the selection of refugees applying from abroad.
1. A single, flexible, annual refugee ceiling should be established covering
all admissions tinder sections 207 and 208. Such a ceiling can be incorporated
into the law by taking the following three steps. First, section 207(a)(1) should be
amended to read:
Except as provided in subsection (b), the total number of refugees under this Section,
and of asylees under Section 208, may not exceed that number which is specified by
the President after consultation with Congress, and after a determination is made
that such number is in the national interest and is justified by humanitarian con-
cerns.
Second, a clause should be added to subsection (b) (the "emergency situation"
refugee provision) permitting a revision in the ceiling after appropriate consulta-
tion "it either an unforeseen emergency refugee situation exists or an unforeseen
mass asylum situation exists." Third, a definition of "unforeseen mass asylum
situation" should be added specifying that the term shall inlude
any influx of aliens not anticipated at the time the determination under subsection
(a) was made, provided that: (1) these aliens colorably meet the definition of
"asylee" set forth in Section 208 or the regulations interpreting it; and (2) these aliens
number at least 2,500 from any country, or 5,000 in total.
2. A single standard should be required for granting refuge to individuals
applying from outside the country and meeting the refugee definition. This stan-
dard should be "in the national interest and of special humanitarian concern." A
nonexclusive definition of "of special humanitarian concern" should be included
in the statute. That definition should specify that
(a) Any individual who is a refugee and whose life is placed in immediate jeopardy,
or whose personal safety is threatened, or who faces the imminent possibility of loss of
freedom shall be deemed to be "of special humanitarian concern."
(b) Any other individual who is a refugee may be deemed "of special humanitarian
concern" in the discretion of the Attorney General,
Adopting such a definition would neither create additional refugee slots nor pre-
clude decisions tinged with political motives. But such a provision would put
additional emphasis on the congressionally intended humanitarian purpose of
the 1980 Act.
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